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We argue that the concepts of “freedom of choice” and of “causal order” are intrinsically linked:
a choice is considered “free” if it is correlated only to variables in its causal future. We discuss the
implications of this to Bell-type scenarios, where two separate measurements are carried out, neither
of which lies in the causal future of the other, and where one typically assumes that the measurement
settings are chosen freely. Furthermore, we refute a recent criticism made by Ghirardi and Romano
in [arXiv:1301.5040] and [arXiv:1302.1635] that we used an unphysical freedom of choice assumption
in our previous works, [Nat. Commun. 2, 411 (2011)] and [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402 (2012)].
Consider a simple experiment in which a system is
prepared in state Z, then a measurement A is chosen
and applied to the system, and finally the outcome X is
recorded. How should we express the requirement that
A is a free choice?
We may think of Z, A, andX as random variables with
joint probability distribution PZAX . For A to be free it is
natural to demand that it can be chosen independently
of the state Z, i.e., PA|Z = PA. However, it would be
too restrictive to also require independence from X, i.e.,
PA|ZX = PA, as we expect the outcome of an experiment
to depend on how we measure. The notion of free choice
is hence intrinsically connected to a causal order: we
don’t require that the free choice A is uncorrelated with
X since X lies in the causal future of A.
This can be easily extended to scenarios involving more
than one measurement. As above, a system’s state, mea-
surement choices, and measurement outcomes may be
modeled as random variables, the collection of which we
denote by Γ. A causal order is then simply a preorder
relation [8] (→) on Γ (see Fig. 1 for examples). A → X
should be interpreted as “X is in the causal future of
A” [9]. While the causal order may, in principle, be de-
fined arbitrarily, it is reasonable to demand that it be
compatible with time-ordering, defined as follows. For
two random variables, A and X, the order A → X is
taken to hold if and only if A occurs at an earlier time
than the generation of X (with respect to all relativistic
frames [10]) [11].
Given a set Γ with an (arbitrary) causal order, we can
define the concept of a free choice as follows [12]:
A choice A ∈ Γ is free if A is uncorrelated
with the set of allW ∈ Γ that satisfy A 6→W .
Said another way, A is free if the only variables it is
correlated with are those it could have caused. Note that
the condition A 6→W cannot be replaced byW → A [13].
To demonstrate the use of this definition, we consider
a Bell-type setup, where two particles are generated in
state Z and subsequently measured at two distant loca-
tions. Let A and B be the choices of the measurement
settings at the two locations, and let X and Y be the cor-
responding measurement outcomes. The two measure-
ments should be arranged such that neither lies in the
causal future of the other, as depicted in Fig. 1(b). We
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FIG. 1: Two examples of a causal order. In (a), F being free
implies PF |EG = PF , while in (b), if A is free then PA|BY Z =
PA, for example.
note that, physically, this causal order can be obtained
by carrying out the two measurements in two spacelike
separated regions, and demanding that the causal order
be compatible with time-ordering. Now, assuming that
A is free means that PA|BY Z = PA.
In recent work, we have used the assumption of free
choice to show that there cannot exist any extension of
quantum theory with improved predictive power [1], and
that the quantum wave function is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with its elements of reality [2] (see also [3]).
The assumption is also used in experimental work that
provides a fundamental bound on the maximum proba-
bility by which the outcomes of measurements in a Bell-
type setup can be predicted correctly [4]. Unhappy with
these consequences, Ghirardi and Romano have, in a se-
quence of two papers [5] and [6], criticized the use of
the freedom of choice assumption in these works, calling
it “unphysical” [14]. However, the concept of free choice
used in [1–4] is precisely the one explained in this note for
a causal order compatible with time-ordering (as defined
above), and hence has a clear physical motivation.
We conclude by remarking that this notion of free
choice matches what Bell said about “free variables” [7]:
For me this means that the values of such
variables have implications only in their fu-
ture light cones.
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